PPSA Vote: Should Doctors Accept a Bad Offer to Avoid a Worse One?

PPSA Vote
PPSA Vote (photo credit below)

Before medical politics died in Ontario, a PPSA vote meant three hundred doctors from across the province packed into the basement of a hotel in downtown Toronto.

A room full of frowning doctors debating fees was much like kids lighting matches near a haystack.

Inevitably, someone would yell at the board, insult a colleague, or slander the government. Every so often, the Chair would wack away with his gavel, completely ignored by the angry mob.

At one meeting, a red-faced little man stomped several hundred feet across the front of the room and shoved his face in front of another doctor. The angry man had taken offence. He demanded an immediate apology. Or would the other member care to step outside the chamber?

PPSA VotE Needs More Data

The PPSA appears to offer a 1 per cent increase per year with (hopefully) 2.8 per cent in year three.

But what does this mean?

How do specific fee cuts impact income?

Do we have to work 10 per cent harder for a 1 per cent increase?

How does inflation impact the outcome?

How is income impacted by elimination of thresholds and system redesign?

The OMA used to publish fancy graphs of how physician income has changed relative to inflation. The graphs ended when they became too embarrassing.

Governments changed, but OMA performance stayed the same. Endless sub-inflationary increases imposed by successive governments made the OMA look bad.

In 2015, we pushed the OMA to publish an analysis of net income. It showed a steep decline from 2011 to 2015, with an expected 28 per cent cut by 2017-18:

Net Real Income. PPSA Vote

Hazard a Guess At the Cuts Now?

Let’s hope the OMA offers an update. In the meantime, we can try to do our own.

Consider a physician who bills $160,000 and pays $60,000 in overhead (37.5 %). The total billing will increase at 1 per cent for 2021 and 2022, and 2.8 per cent for 2023.

Let’s assume a general inflation rate of 5 per cent. This means office overhead will grow at 5 per cent each year, and spending power (net income) will decrease by 5 per cent each year.

Medical overhead always outpaces inflation, and general inflation may be closer to 7 per cent, but let’s be conservative.

This gives us an 18.7 per cent net decrease over three years. You will feel like you have 20 per cent less to live on. If inflation runs over 5 per cent, a much higher cut seems reasonable.

Add in all the other specific cuts as they apply to your own specialty.

PPSA Vote

A Fair Process?

Failure to ratify used to mean rolling the dice at arbitration, but at least you got a second chance.

But the chair of the board of arbitration has warned doctors. Do not expect fee increases; arbitration is already fixed.

This makes arbitration a sham.

The whole point of arbitration was to avoid predetermined outcomes. Remove the power imbalance. Enforce fair bargaining. Do not let one side (government) predetermine the price before negotiation even begins.

But Premier Ford made his final offer in Nov 2019. Between May 1, 2020, and April 30, 2023, Ford will pay 1% and not a penny more (Bill 124).

Some think this fair, but does it even make sense?

In 2020, gas was $1.04 per litre. Today, it is $1.70, in S. Ontario. Government wants to fill the medical gas tank at $1.04, plus 1 per cent per year.

Health Reform on the Fly

The proposed contract has far too many silly details to unpack them all: arbitrary limits to practice size, micro-managing office locations, and more. Each detail requires several paragraphs to unpack.

Consider one example.

In the late 1990s, family doctors were a dying breed. Medical students avoided family medicine, and nearly 1.5 million Ontarians could not find a family doc.

Government absolutely refused to increase fees for GP services. Fee for service (FFS) medicine rewards doctors for meeting as many patient needs as possible. It offers no easy way to contain spending.

In the early 2000s, government agreed to increase payments to primary care, but only if government could gain control of costs.

Primary care reform offered the answer.

A basket of patient-enrolment models (FHNs, FHGs, and FHOs) incentivized doctors to roster patients in return for an annual fee. The top rates for an average patient run around $200 per year, to provide a basket of approximately 130 services.

Very few family docs practice FFS medicine any more, although most specialists still do. FFS is bad, according to the experts. It rewards doctors for providing more services. More services mean the government must spend more on care.

Rostered, patient-enrolment models encourage doctors to offer fewer, longer visits, instead of churning patients for multiple return visits. Rostering incentivizes team care and coming up with creative ways to interact and share information without dragging patients back to clinic.

Whereas FFS incentivizes increased visits, rostering is designed to decrease them.

Government has decided it does not like fewer visits after all.

The Ministry of Health wants FFS visit numbers with rostered-payment certainty. Government aspires to 88 visits per week for every 1300 patients rostered. This will incentivize more frequent, shorter visits. It is hard to see how chopping one long visit into three in order to meet government targets will improve quality or care.

How Should You Vote?

It’s not a great offer. But at least it’s only 3 years.

This comes from the OMA negotiations team, in a town hall meeting. It is almost verbatim.

Better accept this offer or else. There is no guarantee of getting half as good at arbitration.

A Hobson’s choice is one which does not offer an alternative: take it or leave it. Unpalatability of the alternative removes real choice.

Closing Thought – Incomes as Information

“Doctors earn enough.”

“You can take the cut.”

I have heard many variations of this modern noblesse oblige. The average doctor lives well enough.

As a physician, you care about your income. It matters to you and your family. But that is not why your income matters to the rest of the world.

Physician income only matters to the extent it impacts patient care. 

Does your income attract others to train in your specialty? Do your fees reward you for taking extra call each month?

We want the world to think we would do extra call for free. But it is not true. If people are not paid properly, call schedules become impossible to fill. Emergency departments become short staffed.

I need solid fees in place to guarantee that a vascular surgeon has moved to our area and is eager to answer my call at 3 in the morning. If I have no vascular surgeon, my patient dies.

The PPSA is not about you as a doctor. It’s about whether it is good for patient care.

Does the PPSA build healthcare?

Will your PPSA vote increase care overall or will it undermine the frail shell we have currently?

I cannot in good conscience support this contract. In this PPSA vote, I will vote no.

Photo credit: Pixabay Images Tumisu

Check out Part I: Doctors’ Contracts Are About Central Planning, Not Incomes: Ontario’s PPSA and all the excellent comments!

Doctors’ Contracts Are About Central Planning, Not Incomes: Ontario’s PPSA

PPSA
Physician contracts (photo credit below)

Physicians frustrate governments. Doctors think too little about how much care costs and too much about patients who need help.

The Government of Ontario and the Ontario Medical Association arrived at a mediated Proposed Physicians Services Agreement (PPSA) this month. Doctors vote on it on March 22 – 27.

On March 28, we find out whether doctors will accept the agreement or send it to arbitration.

Labour negotiations give government its best chance to manage the $14 billion spent in Ontario on medical services (2020-21). Contracts offer a way to control doctors’ behaviour. Medical services agreements are the heart of central planning in Canada.

A Mediated PPSA

Government does not care about doctors’ incomes, nor should it.

When it comes to medical services, government cares about spending and access. When it comes to negotiations, politicians care about labour peace and avoiding awkward headlines. Continue reading “Doctors’ Contracts Are About Central Planning, Not Incomes: Ontario’s PPSA”

Bossy Doctors – 7 Reasons Why Some Docs Are Bossy

Bossy
Bossy (credit below)

Doctors are at high risk for becoming bossy — especially towards their colleagues. Otherwise kind, rational doctors can become tyrants in the face of chaos and fear.

If we were hunting for bossy docs, we might start with medical leaders and physicians in niche specialities.

External Causes

Leadership carries a high risk for bossiness.

Some medical Chiefs gain humility from caring for sick complex patients. It shapes their approach to leadership. Unfortunately, many forget their failures. Others never learned in the first place.

Many Chiefs of Staff have never seen sick patients at all. But as Chief, they see all the medical disasters and deal with the most difficult doctors. They run the risk of thinking all docs are difficult and basically failures waiting to happen.

Like leadership, some specialities are also more likely to foster bossiness. Niches with low medical risk and high paternalism present the biggest risk. These docs never see sick patients but spend all day giving definitive advice.

However, chiefs and niches do not explain enough. Not all docs become bossy from being chief or a member of a medical niche.

Blaming bossiness on a chief-niche explanation assumes an external locus of control: bossy docs were victims of a bossiness-inducing environment.

7 Reasons Why Some Doctors Become Bossy

We could also assume an internal locus of control. What goes on inside a doctor to make him/her so bossy?

A. Good intentions

Children torture kittens with cute outfits, “Because Kitty likes it.”

Parents torture children with cute outfits, “Because it makes you look smart, dear.”

Politicians torture citizens with things they would never choose themselves — so-called merit goods.

Doctors do the same.

“Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of its victims may be the most oppressive. It would be better to live under robber barons than under omnipotent moral busybodies.

The robber baron’s cruelty may sometimes sleep, his cupidity may at some point be satiated; but those who torment us for our own good will torment us without end for they do so with the approval of their own conscience.”

CS Lewis

B.  Habit

Many doctors give orders for a living.

A group of us asked a young cardiac surgeon about life with his new baby. Had he changed any diapers yet?

In a heavy accident, he said:

Oh sure. I call my wife. She comes. I hold out my hand, like this.

He held out hand, palm up.

Then I say, ‘Wet wipes!’ And she give it.

‘Lotion!’ And she give it.

‘Diaper!…’

Just like surgery.”

C. Prudence

Most doctors are practical. Especially in procedural specialties, we use the shortest path between intervention and outcome.

Barking orders wastes less time than decision by committee.

D. Ignorance

Doctors do not study leadership to become doctors. Aside from loads of math and science, most doctors do not study much of anything else. Medicine demands total commitment without room for non-clinical things.

E. Hubris

Many docs assume they are so much smarter than everyone else that they should be the boss.

F. Arrogance

Arrogance goes beyond hubris. Some doctors cannot tolerate anyone else in control. They hold others in disdain.

G. Maleficence

A few doctors hate their colleagues. They want to cause pain. A position of power, such as Chief of Staff, lets them exercise their wish.

Hubris, arrogance, and maleficence are less common, but we have to admit they exist.

Helpful Bossiness

Many situations demand a level of control which looks bossy. In this sense, bossiness may not be bad in itself, only when misapplied.

It is a bit like debridement. Dead tissue needs to be cut off to save the healthy bits underneath. Cutting too little is bad. Removing vital parts is worse.

Fortunately, only rare wounds need major debridement. Most need a light cleaning or nothing at all. Too often people use bossiness when it is not necessary — like debriding healthy tissue.

Internal Cause, External Opportunity

Pandemic chaos and fear created a petri dish for bossiness. It turned some otherwise rational doctors into dictators.

COVID gave literal or social media microphones to some very bossy docs. Politicians deferred to a handful of experts. No one dared speak against them. The few who did faced punishment.

As pandemic fear subsides and normal chaos returns, we should ask:

Who were the bossiest docs?

Who needs counselling after losing their COVID pulpit?

Can we protect ourselves from bossy docs in the future?

Some docs are just born bossy. They use power to work out their own issues. But we don’t need to let them ruin our lives in the process.

Photo credit: Pixabay